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PATRICIA K. WOUTERS*

An Assessment of Recent
Developments- in International
Watercourse Law through the Prism of
the Substantive Rules Governing Use
Allocation
ABSTRACT
This paper examines recent developments in the law relating to the
non-navigationaluses of internationalwatercourses.More specifically,
the substantive rules that govern watercourseuse-the principles of
equitable utilization and no harm--areconsidered in two lights: as
they have been developed by the InternationalLaw Commission in its
Draft Articles on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercources, and as they are reflected in current state practice. The
author concludes that the work of the ILC does not concur with state
practiceand suggests that Article 7 of the ILC Draft be reconsidered.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Ready to fight to the last drop"-so read a recent article describing
the shortage of international fresh water resources.' Many experts,
including UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,2 see some truth in
this assertion. In fact, there are those who predict the outbreak of "water
wars" in the foreseeable future.3
A quick survey of the relevant facts speaks for itself: the quantity
of fresh water resources continues to diminish for an ever-increasing

* Lecturer, Centre for Petroleum & Mineral Law & Policy (Dundee); Ph.D. candidate,
Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva); LL.M., (Berkeley, California); B.A.,
LL.B. (University of Ottawa). The author is a member of the Water Resources Committee
of the International Law Association and is currently preparing a doctoral dissertation on
the substantive rules of international watercourse law. The author wishes to thank the
Directors of the Max-Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law for
the use of the resources of the Institute in the preparation of this article.
1. John Vidal, Ready to Fight to the Last Drop, GUARDIAN WEEKLY, Aug. 20, 1995, at 13.
2. Id.(citing comments by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali at the Rivers
of the Middle East Colloquium in 1988).
3. J. BULLOCH & A. DARWISH, WATER WARS: COMING CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

199 (1993).
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population.4 Pervasive abuse of the environment affects water quality in
some parts of the world to such an extent as to be life-threatening 5
This article considers recent developments in the law relating to the
non-navigational uses of international water-courses through the rubric of
the substantive rules that govern use allocation. The principles of equitable
utilization and no harm6 will be examined in two lights: as they have been
developed by the International Law Commission (ILC)7 and as they have
been applied in recent State practice.
In 1994, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided that
at the beginning of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly, the Sixth Committee shall convene as a working group of
the whole, open to States Members of the United Nations or
members of specialized agencies, for three weeks from 7 to 25
4. One expert asserts: Growing populations will worsen problems with absolute water
availability. In 18 countries of the world in 1990, absolute per capita water availability falls
below 1,000 m3 per year, a level some suggest is an approximate minimum necessary for
an adequate quality of life in a moderately developed country. By the year 2025, over 30
countries will be unable to provide 1,000 m3 per person per year, simply because of
population growth. P.H. GLEICK, Water in the 21st Century, in WATER IN CRISIS: A GUIDE TO
THE WORLD'S FRESH WATER RESOURCES 104, 105 (P.H. Gleick ed., 1993). See also Pamela

LeRoy, Troubled Waters: Population and Water Scarcity, 6 COL. J.INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 299
(1995); Remarks by Caroline Thomas, panel on Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, Proceedings of the Second Joint Conference (July 22-24,1993), in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: OPPORTUNITIES AT ATIME OF MOMENTOUS CHANGE 386-87

(R. Lefeber ed., 1994).
5. The Vice-President of the World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, has estimated that there
are 80 countries where water shortages threaten health and economies; 40% of the world
population has no access to clean water. Vidal, supra note 1; see also Thomas, supra note 4,
at 386.
6. On the issues generally, see Jerome Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in THE 'LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 89 (A.H. Garretson et al. eds., 1967); see also Gunther

Handl, The Principle of 'Equitable Use' As Applied to International Shared Resources, 14 REVUE
BELGE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 40 (1978); Gunther Haridl, Balancing of Interests and
International Liability for the Pollution of International Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law
Revisited, 13 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 156 (1975); Charles Bourne, The Right to Utilize the Waters of
International Rivers, 3 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 187 (1965).
7. The ILC adopted a complete set of Draft Articles, with commentaries, on
international watercourse law in 1994. See Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, at
197 (1994) [hereinafter ILC 1994 Draft Articles]; see also Stephen McCaffrey, Current
Developments: The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on International
Watercourses, 89 A.J.I.L. 395, 399 (1995) thereinafter McCaffrey, Current Developments);
Stephen McCaffrey, The International Law Commission, 5 Y.B. OF INT'L. ENVTL. L. 513, 516

(1994); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses-The International Law Commission Completes its Draft, 8 LEIDEN J.INT'L LAW 361, 362 (1995);
Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, Current Developments: The Work of the
Sixth Committee at the Forty-Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly, 89 AM. J.INT'L. L. 607,
615 (1995).
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October 1996, to elaborate a framework convention on the law
of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses on
the basis of the draft articles adopted by the International Law
Commission in light of the written comments and observations
of States and views expressed in the debate of the forty-ninth
session.8
States were invited to submit written comments on the ILC's Draft Articles
by July 1, 1996." The success of this work depends ultimately upon its
acceptance by states. Identification of the substantive rules that govern
watercourse uses will no doubt be a controversial and difficult issue. 10
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSE LAW
A.

The principles of "equitable utilization"and "no harm"

The principle of equitable utilization, which evolved from early
inter-state practice involving watercourses" determines the legitimacy of
a use by balancing all factors relevant to a particular case and determining
from that whether the use is an equitable and reasonable one. The no harm
rule, which originated as a general principle of law in inter-state
relations, 2 in the context of international watercourses precludes uses that
8. U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 293 1 3, U.N. Doc. (A/49/49)Doc.
A/RES/49/52 (1995).
9. Id.
10. States have demonstrated their divergent views on the ILC's approach to the
substantive rules governing watercourses from the outset of the project. See The Law of the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Replies by Governments to the International
Law Commission's Questionnaire, U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/294, A/CN.4/294/Add. 1,A/CN.4/314, A/CN.4/324, A/CN.4/329, A/CN.4/329/Add.1,
A/CN.4/348, A/CN.4/352,
A/CN.4/352/Add. 1 (1976); The Law of the Non-NavigationalUses of InternationalWatercourses,
Comments and Observations Received from States, U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/447, A/CN.4/447/Add.1, Add., Add.3 (1993).
11. Early European decisions include Aargau v. Zurich, Recueil Officiel des Arrts du
Tribunal Fdiral IV, 34 (1878); the Donauversinkung Case, Wiirttemberg & Prussia v. Baden,
4 D.P.I.L. 128 (1927-28); 116 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 18 (1927);
Soci~t6 Energie Electrique du Littoral Mediterrant-en v. Compagnia Imprese Elettriche
Liguri, 9 D.P.I.L. 120 (1938-40); 91 Giurisprudenza Italiana 518 (1939). The doctrine of
equitable apportionment was refined in a series of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court; see,
e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); K~ansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 208 (1902); Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660(1931); New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 (1932); Missouri
v. Illinois 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Wisconsin v. Illinois 278 U.S. 367 (1929); Wisconsin v. Illinois,
281 U.S. 179 (1930). See also Lucius Caflisch, The Law of International Waterways and Its
Sources, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA, 115 (R.StJ. Macdonald ed., 1993).

12. See, e.g., the Trail Smelter arbitral award, 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1938,33 A.J.I.L. 182 (1939);
Corfu Channel decision, 1949 I.C.J. 4; Lac Lanoux arbitral award, 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957).
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result in significant 3 harm to another State. The conflict between the two
principles is readily apparent. While the former rule might permit
significant harm as a result of an equitable use of the watercourse, the latter
would not.
The principles of equitable utilization and no harm each require
precision in their application; this occurs on a case-by-case basis. The
procedural rules of notification, exchange of information, and consultation
assist in this task. 4 Additionally, the general duty to cooperate,15 and the
customary obligation that states peacefully settle their disputes 6
encourage watercourse states to settle any contests over -water by
agreement.
The normative content of, and the inter-relationship between, the
principles of equitable utilization and no harm in the field of watercourse
law is defined not only in the ILC Draft, but also in the works of l'Institut
17
de droit international (IDI) and the International Law Association (ILA).
The approach in each case is different. 8 While the ILC has adopted a
nuanced version of the no significant harm principle as the primary rule of
watercourse law, the ILA embraces equitable utilization as the overarching
principle, 9 and the IDI, except in cases of pollution where all harm is
precluded', proposes that equity prevail."
13. The harm caused must be above a certain threshold. Terms such as "significant,"
"substantial," and "appreciable" have been used to identify the threshold.
14. See, e.g., ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 7, at art. 9, 11-19; see also Charles Bourne,
Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins: The Duty to Consult and to
Negotiate, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 212 (1972) [hereinafter Bourne Duty to Consult]; Charles

Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins, 22 U. TOR. L.J. 172
(1972).

15. Article 7 provides: "[wlatercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign
equality, territorial integrity and mutual benefit in order to attain optimum utilization and
adequate protection of an international watercourse." ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 7,
at art. 8.
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.

17. Also see the more detailed article on the work of the ILA by Charles Bourne in this
issue of the Natural Resources Journal.
18. See Patricia Wouters, Allocation of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses: Efforts at Codification and the Experience of Canadaand the United States, 30 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 43 (1992).
19. See Report of the Fifty-Second Conference, ILA, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the
Waters of International Rivers, at 484, 496-497 (1966) (articles IV and X); Report of the Sixtieth
Conference ILA, Montreal Rules on Pollution, at 531, 535 (1982) (Article 1); Report of the
Sixty-Second Conference, ILA, Seoul Complementary Rules, at 232 (1986) (Article 1).
20. Article 2 of the IDI's Athens Resolution on Pollution provides:
In the exercise of their sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and without prejudice to
their contractual obligations, States shall be under a duty to ensure that
their activities or those conducted within their jurisdiction or under their
control cause no pollution in the waters of international rivers and lakes
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A crucial question thus arises: What rule determines the legitimacy
of international watercourse use where there are insufficient resources to
support new water-related develop-ments? z The issue is a complex one,
both in water quantity and quality problems. When is a State permitted to
use the waters of international watercourse for hydro-electric power
generation? Is foreseeable pollution of international waters ever allowed?
The IDI, ILA and ILC each provide different solutions to these questions.'
B. The Work of the InternationalLaw Commission
1. Introduction
Following more than two decades of work on the topic, the ILC
produced in 1994 a complete project relating to the law governing the
non-navigational uses of international water-courses. 4 The Draft Articles
comprise thirty-three articles supplemented by a resolution on
transboundary ground water. Part II of the Draft, which contains the
general principles of watercourse law, includes Articles 5-10 of which
Articles 5 and 7 set forth the cornerstone rules of the work.
2. The ILC's development of the principlesof equitable utilizationand
no harm in internationalwatercourselaw
The principles of equitable utilization and no harm are found in
Articles 5 and 7 of the ILC's 1994 Draft Articles. Article 5, unchanged from
its 1991 version', provides:
(1)Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize
an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used
and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining

beyond their boundaries.

See Athens Res., 1979

ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROrT INTERNATIONAL 196.
21. Article 3 of the IDI's Salzburg Resolution provides: "If the States are in disagreement over the scope of their rights of utilization, settlement will take place on the basis of
equity, taking particular account of their respective needs, as well as of other pertinent
circumstances." See IDI Salzburg Res., 1961 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROrr INTERNATION-

AL 381.

22. See McCaffrey, Current Developments, supra note 7, at 399-401; see also Stephen
McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Some Recent Developments and Unanswered
Questions, 17 DENY. J.INTL L. & POL'Y 505 (1989).
23. See Wouters, supra note 18, at 46-52.
24. See McCaffrey, Current Developments, supra note 7, at 395-99.
25. ILC Draft Articles and Commentaries on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, adopted on First Reading, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., at 1, U.N.

Doc. A/CN.4/L.463/Add.4 (1991) [hereinafter ILC 1991 Draft Articles].
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optimum utilization thereof and benefits therefrom consistent
with adequate protection of the watercourse.
(2) Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development
and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable
and reasonable manner. Such participation includes both the
right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to co-operate in the
protection and development thereof, as provided in the present
articles.'
Article 6 contains a non-exhaustive list of the relevant factors to
consider in the assessment of an equitable and reasonable use. Notably, the
provision does not include 'harm' or 'injury' as factors to be applied in this
context.27
The principle of no harm, in Article 7 of the 1994 Draft, replaces the
former "no-appreciable harm" rule contained in the 1991 Draft.' The
revised provision reads:
(1) Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an
international watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States.
(2) Where, despite the exercise of due diligence, significant harm
is caused to another watercourse State, the State whose use
causes the harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use,
consult with the State suffering harm over:
(a) the extent to which the use has proved equitable
and reasonable taking into account the factors listed
in Article 6;
(b) the question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilization, designed to eliminate or mitigate any such
harm caused, and, where appropriate, the question
of compensation."
Reconciliation of the rules contained in Articles 5 and 7 is not an

26. ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 7, at art. 5.
27. This is distinct from Article V of the ILA's Helsinki Rules which includes
"substantial injury" as a factor to be considered in the assessment of an equitable utilization.
28. Article 7 provided: "Watercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse
in such a way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States." ILC 1991 Draft
Articles, supra note 25, at art. 7. The ILC's decision to adopt this provision as the primary
rule of the entire Draft was controversial. See Charles Bourne, Principles and Planned
Measures, 3 COL. J. INT'L ENV'L L. & POL'Y 65 (1992); Lucius Caflisch, Sic Utere Tuo Ut
Alienum Non Laedas: Regle Prioritaire ou Eldment Servant 4 Mesurer le Droit de Participation
Equitable et Raisonnable 4 l'Utilisation d'un Cours d'Eau International?, in INTERNATIONALES
REcHT AUF SEE UND BINNENGEWASSERN 27 (1992); Stephen McCaffrey, The Evolution of the

Law of International Watercourses, 45 AUSTRIAN J.PUB. INT'L L. 87 (1993); Stephen McCaffrey,
The International Law Commission and Its Efforts to Codify the International Law of Waterways,
67 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DRoir INTERNATIONAL 32 (1990).

29. ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 7,at art. 7.
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easy task. Is the legitimacy of a use determined by a balancing of the
equities or the rule of due diligence not to cause significant harm? The
ILC's attempt to clarify this issue in its Commentary to Article 7 only
confounds the issue.
The Commentary to Article 7, revised also in its final stages,"1
illustrates the difficulty the Commission had in trying to balance the
substantive rules of the Draft.31 The Commentary begins with the
explanation that Article 7 "is setting forth a process aimed at avoiding
significant harm as far as possible while reaching an equitable result in
concrete cases."32 In certain cases, the "'equitable and reasonable utilization' of an international watercourse may still involve significant harm to
another watercourse State"33 and "the principle of equitable utilization
remains the guiding criterion in balancing the interests at stake."3 Despite
this introductory part dedicated to the role of the principle of equitable
utilization, the Commentary continues, somewhat paradoxically, by
asserting that the obligation contained in Article 7 "sets the threshold for
lawful States activity."3' The normative content of the rules is explained
in the Commentary:
A watercourse State can be deemed to have violated its due
diligence obligation only if it knew or ought to have known that
the particular use of an international watercourse would cause
significant harm to other watercourse States.'
It is clear from the foregoing that qualification of a use as an
equitable and reasonable one is insufficient to legitimize proceeding with
the development. Under the ILC's rules, a State may develop a use only
where it knows or ought to know that it would not cause significant harm
to other states. This is the test to be met under Article 7. In this light, the
due-diligence-not- to-cause-significant-harm rule is, in effect, an obligation
not to cause significant harm and remains the governing rule of the entire
Draft.37 This position is supported by the second paragraph of Article 7
30. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.4.L.493 at 43-52 (1994).
31. See also ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 7, at commentary to art. 7 911 22, 23 where
the divergent views of the Commission's member over Article 7 is recorded.
32. ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 7, at commentary to art. 7 9 1.
33. Id. at commentary to art. 7 1 2.
34. Id.
35. Id. at commentary to art. 7 1 4.
36. Id. at commentary to 1 5. On the notion of due diligence, see R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi,
The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States, 35 GERM.
Y.I.L. 9 (1992); P.M. Dupuy, Due Diligencein the InternationalLaw of Liability, in OECD, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 369 (1977).

37. Professor McCaffrey, former Special Rapporteur on the topic, has observed, 'The
final version of the draft does not reverse the primacy of the no-harm rule but softens the
regime... "; see McCaffrey, Current Developments, supra note 7, at 399.
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which reduces the principle of equitable utilization to a mere factor to be
considered in consultations where significant harm has occurred.'
The primacy of the no significant harm rule is reinforced in Articles
10 and 21 of the Draft. The former provision gives special weight to existing
uses where "vital human needs" are involved.' The Commentary to
Article 10 describes this criterion as "an accentuated form" of the factor
referred to in Article 6(1)(b) of the Draft.' The prescribed preferential
treatment of iany particular factor precludes a true application of the
principle of equitable utilization and imposes a no harm approach aimed
at protecting prior uses.
The ILC's position with respect to pollution harm is more stringent
than the general rule in Article 7. Article 21 contains an absolute prohibition
of pollution that "may cause significant harm."4 This provision "encompasses all pollution, whether or not it results in 'significant
harm' to other
"
watercourse states within the meaning of Article 7.42
3. Summary of the ILC's Substantive Rules Governing the Non-navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses
Clearly, the ILC has maintained the no significant harm rule as the
governing rule of watercourse law. The nuanced version of the rule now
contained in Article 7 mitigates the harshness of its predecessor and moves
it closer to the principle of equitable utilization.43 It does not, however,
reconcile entirely the conflicting substantive rules. The suggestion that the
conflict between the two provisions is more apparent than real" overlooks

38. ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note"7, at art. 7(2)(a).

39. Article 10 provides:
1.In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an
international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
2. In the event of a conflict between the uses of an international watercourse, it shall be resolved with reference to the principles and factors set
out in articles 5 to 7,with special regard being given to the requirements of vital
human needs.
ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 7, at art. 10 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at commentary to art. 10.
41. Article 21(2) provides:
Watercourse states shall, individually or jointly, prevent, reduce and
control pollution of an international watercourse that may cause significant
harm to other watercourse States or to their environment, including harm
to human health or safety, to the use of the waters for any beneficial
purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse.
ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 7, at art. 21(2) (emphasis added).
42. Id. at commentary to 1.
43. McCaffrey, Current Developments, supra note 7, at 399.
44. Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AND FRESHWATER
RESOURCES: A CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECOSYSTEM LAW, 5 Y.B. INT'L E. LAW 41, 63 (1995).
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a very important difference in the application of each rule. Whereas
foreseeable significant harm might be justified under the principle of
equitable utilization, it can never be permitted under the due diligence rule
contained in Article 7. In the former case, significant harm can be dealt with
prospectively by all states concerned. Under Article 7, however, significant
harm can only be dealt with post factum, a situation less favorable to the
victim State.
Under Article 7, where, despite the exercise of due diligence,
significant harm occurs, states are required only to consult over whether
the use was equitable and if the harm can be mitigated or compensated
for.4' It is not clear what result these consultations are to have on the status
of the use. Also uncertain is the relationship between subparagraphs (a)
and (b) of Article 7(2).1 A more compelling question is the precise nature
of the remedy offered the victim State under that provision.
III. INTERNATIONAL STATE PRACTICE
A. Introduction
This part of the article focuses on recent international agreements
involving watercourses. State activity in this field is remarkable in three
respects: in the number of agreements, in the content of those agreements,
and in the particular states involved. This will become clear following the
next part of the article which focuses on the use-allocation rules contained
in each agreement.
B. MultilateralAgreements of a GeneralScope
Concluded in March 1992, the U.N. Helsinki Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes47 (Helsinki Convention) is the first multilateral treaty relating to
watercourse uses since the relatively unsuccessful 1923 Geneva Convention
Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting more than One
State (Geneva Convention).' Ratified by a mere eleven states, the Geneva

45. ILC 1994 Draft Articles, supra note 7, at art. 7(2)(a), (b).
46. Neither the article nor the commentary make clear what effect the determination
that the subject use is equitable-or not equitable-will have on the legitimacy of the use
being considered. Presumably, the relative equity of the use might be considered to be
relevant to the question of ad hoc adjustments to the use or the issue of compensation as
referred to in article 7(2)(b), or possibly in the case of dispute settlement under article 33 of
the draft.
47. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312 (1992) [hereinafter Helsinki Convention].
48. Geneva Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting
more than One State, Dec. 9, 1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 76 (entered into force June 30, 1925).
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Convention, though referred to in one international arbitration, 9 was of
limited influence.'
The Helsinki Convention, which contains twenty-eight articles and
four annexes, has had wide support."1 The overall purpose of the treaty is
to limit transboundary impact arising from the utilization of international
waters. Under Article 2, the Parties are required to "take all appropriate
measures to prevent, control and reduce any transboundary impact," 2
which is defined broadly. 3
To meet the goal of the convention, Parties are obliged "[t]o ensure
that transboundary waters are used in a reasonable and equitable way,
taking into particular account their transboundary character, in the case of
activities which cause or are likely to cause transboundary impact."'
"Riparian Parties," in particular, are required to conclude agreements 55
which provide for the establishment of joint bodies in order to meet their
obligations under the convention.Parties are held to a "best efforts" standard throughout the
Agreement. In Article 2, for example, Parties are required to "take all
appropriate measures" in undertaking the obligations set forth [emphasis

49. Lac Lanoux Arbitral Award, 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957). The tribunal examined the
drafting history of the Geneva Convention in order to determine whether prior consent was
required before a basin State could proceed with works.
50. Report of the Secretary General, Legal Problems Relating to the Utilization and Use of
International Rivers, U.N. Doc. A/5409, 119741 2 Y.B. INT'L. L. COMMISSION 33. See also P.
Sevette, Legal Aspects of Hydro-Electric Development of Rivers and Lakes of Common Interest, U.N.
Doc. E/ECE/136, at 153 (1952). The Convention appeared to influence Latin American states
in their approach. See Bourne, Duty to Consult, supra note 14, at 213.
51. As of September 18, 1992 (the date until which the Convention was open for
signature), there were 26 signatories (Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia,
European Economic Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian
Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom). See 31 I.L.M. 1599 (1992).
52. Helsinki Convention, supra note 47, at art. 2(1).
53. Under the Convention, "transboundary impact" means
any significant adverse effect on the environment resulting from a change
in the conditions of transboundary waters caused by a human activity, the
physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within an area under
the jurisdiction of a Party, within an area under the jurisdiction of another
Party. Such effects on the environment include effects on human health
and safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape and historical
monuments or other physical structures or the interaction among these
factors; they also include effects on the cultural heritage or socio-economic
conditions resulting from alterations to those factors.
Id. at art. 1(2).
54. Id. at art. 2(2)(c).
55. Id. at art. 2(6), art. 9(1).
56. Id. at art. 9(2).
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added]. 7 Article 3 requires the Parties "as far as possible, " ' and "where
appropriate, " ' to "prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact." '
In Article 5, Parties agree to "endeavour to initiate" specific research
programs to this end.' Annex I defines "best available technology" 2 and
Annex IIoffers guidelines for developing "best environmental practices."'
The Agreement provides that the Parties are to be guided by "the
precautionary principle," "the polluter-pays principle," and the requirement
that "water resources shall be managed so that the needs of the present
generation are met without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs."" To meet these ends, the Parties agree to
consult, 0 exchange information' and meet regularly.'
The conditional, yet detailed, measures set forth in the Convention,
are undermined somewhat by Article 7 which leaves open the question of
state responsibility. It provides only that "[tihe Parties shall support
appropriate international efforts to elaborate rules, criteria and procedures
in the field of responsibility and liability."'
C. Multilateraland BilateralTreaties of Limited Scope
1. The Rivers Meuse and Scheldt (Belgium, France,and the Netherlands)
On April 26, 1994, in Charleville-Mezi~res, France, agreements on
the protection of the rivers Meuse' and Scheldt' were signed by
representatives from France, the Netherlands and Belgium." The purpose
of each of these documents is to "preserve and improve the quality of the
[Meuse/Scheldt]. "' This is to be accomplished through cooperation "in a
neighborly spirit, keeping in mind their common interests as well as each
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

art. 2.
art. 3(1).
art. 3(3).
art. 3().

61. Id. at art. 5.
62. Id. at Annex 1.
63. Id. at Annex 11.
64. Id. at art, 5(a), (b), (c).
65. Id. at art. 10.
66. Id. at art. 13.
67. Id. at art. 17.
68. Id. at art. 7.
69. Agreement on the Protection of the (River) Meuse, Apr. 26, 1994, Fr.-Neth.-Belg.,
34 I.L.M. 854 (1995).
70. Agreement on the Protection of the (River) Scheldt, Apr. 26, 1994, Fr.-Neth.-Belg.,
34 I.L.M. 859 (1995).
71. The federal constituents of Brussels-Capital and Wallonia signed on Apr. 26, 1994;
Flanders signed each of the treaties in Antwerp on Jan. 17, 1995.
72. Id. at art. 2(1).
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other's special interests. " " An International Commission for the Protection
of the [Meuse/Scheldt] Against Pollution is created in each convention to
ensure the international cooperation committed to in Article 2.7
Regarding use of the waters of the respective basins, and in support
of the general purpose of the convention, the Parties agree "to endeavour
to take appropriate measures to achieve an integrated management of the
[Meuse/Scheldt] drainage area "' and "to work together to ensure
76
'
sustainable development for the [Meuse/Scheldt] and its drainage area."
Further, the Parties are required to "protect and, as far as possible, improve,
by management measures and by the way in which the environment is
used, the quality of the [Meuse/Scheldt's] aquatic ecosystem. "' The
principles of cooperation listed to guide the Parties in meeting their
obligations include the precautionary principle,78 the principle of
preventive action,7 the principle of containment and reduction of
pollution at the source" and the polluter pays principle.8
Article 5 lists the tasks of the Commission. It is designated "as a
forum for the exchange of information on projects which are subject to
impact assessment and which have a significant transboundary impact on
the [Meuse/Scheldt], without prejudice to the domestic legislation of the
'
Contracting Parties. "82
2. The Danube River' (Austria,Bulgaria, Croatia,Germany, Hungary,
Moldova, Romania, Slovak Republic, Ukraine, and the European Community)
Nine of the Danube basin states signed the Convention on
Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River on
October 29, 1994." The Agreement comprises thirty-one articles and five

73. Id.
74. Id. at art. 2(2).
75. Id. at art. 3(4).
76, Id. at art. 3(5).
77. Id. at art. 3(6).
78. Id. at art. 3(2)(a).
79. Id. at art, 3(2)(b).
80. Id. at art. 3(2)(c).
81. ld. at art. 3(2)(d).
82. Id. at art. 5(g).
83. See also Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer & Susan Murcott, The Danube River Basin;
InternationalCooperationfor SustainableDevelopment, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. (forthcoming 1996).
84. Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube
River, Bundesrat, Drucksache 268/95, Dec. 5, 1995, Czech. Rep.-Slov. [hereinafter Danube
Convention]. The Governments of the Czech Republic and Slovenia informed the
Conference of their willingness to sign the Convention as soon as possible. Id., Final Act
at 34 1 9.
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agreement.
Article 6 requires the Parties to prevent, mitigate and eliminate
possible transboundary damage. 2 Article 7 provides for consultation to
establish the annual quantities of water allocated to each State and tries to
insure that these limits are not exceeded. '" The Joint Committee on
Transboundary Waters, created to supervise implementation of the
accord," convenes biannually and reports to each government.' s The
Committee is guided by Article 14 which provides that "Ithe Two
Contracting Parties shall resolve the problems in the implementation of this
Agreement through friendly consultation." The procedural foundation of
the agreement is cooperation through consultation and a regular exchange
of technical and scientific information.1' 6
4. The Mekong River (Cambodia,Laos, Thailand and Vietnam)
On April 5, 1995, in Chiang Rai, Thailand, four of six riparians to
the Mekong--Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam-entered into an
Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the
Mekong. 7 The substantive rule governing water use is found in Article
5, entitled "Reasonable and Equitable Utilization," where the Parties agree
"[tlo utilize the waters of the Mekong River Basin in a reasonable and
equitable manner in their respective territories, pursuant to all relevant
factors and circumstances" and as otherwise agreed to by the Parties."°
This provision also details use of the tributaries and main stream of the
Mekong during the wet and dry seasons)°9

102. Id. at art. 6. The agreement provides that "[tihe Two Contracting Parties shall take

measures to prevent, mitigate and eliminate the possible damages to the quality, resources
and natural dynamics of the transboundary waters and aquatic animals and plants caused
by natural or human factors such as flood, ice run and industrial accident." Id.
103. Id. at art. 7. The agreement provides that "[t]he Two Contracting Parties will decide
through consultation the annual consumption of the transboundary waters. They shall adopt
effective measures to avoid activities on either side of the boundary that lead to the
exceeding of the designated amount of annual water consumption." Id.
104. Id. at art. 10.
105. Id. at art. 11.
106. In fact, each of the provisions of the 15 article agreement contains a reference to
either cooperation or consultation, apart from those articles which deal with definitions or
practical details (relating to the Joint Committee or the coming into force of the accord).
107. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Melxong
River Basin, Cambodia-Laos-Thail.-Vietnam, 34 I.L.M. 864 (1995) [hereinafter Mekong
Agreement]. The two other riparians are Burma and China.
108. See Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-basin Diversion, a previous agreement
between the Parties, referred to in Article 5 of the Mekong Agreement (on file with the
author).
109. Mekong Agreement, supra note 107, at art. 5(A), (B). Article 6 provides details on
the maintenance of the flows on the mainstream. Id. at art. 6.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

Article 3 obliges the Parties "[tlo protect the environment, natural
resources, aquatic life and conditions and ecological balance of the Mekong
River Basin from pollution or other harmful effects resulting from any
development plans and uses of water and related resources in the
Basin."' Article 7 broadens this coverage, requiring the Parties "Itlomake
every effort to avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful effects that might
occur to the environment, especially the water quantity and quality, the
aquatic (eco-system) conditions, and ecological balance of the system, from
the development and use of the Mekong River Basin water resources or discharge of wasters and return flows.""'
"Valid evidence" of "substantial damage" requires cessation of the
harmful activity until the matter is dealt with under Article 8."2 That
provision is an innovative addition to traditional watercourse agreemerits.
It sets forth the regime for state responsibility in the event of substantial
damage:
Where harmful effects cause substantial damage to one of more
riparians from the use of and/or discharge to waters of the
Mekong River by any riparian State, the party(ies) concerned
shall determine all relative factors, the cause, extent of damage
and responsibility for damages caused by that State in conformity with the principles of international law relating to state
responsibility, and to address and resolve all issues, differences
and disputes in an amicable and timely manner by peaceful
and
means as provided in Articles 34 and 35 of this Agreement,
13
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
The broad cooperation provided for in the agreement"' is
tempered somewhat by Article 4 where the Parties agree "[tio cooperate on
the basis of sovereign equality and territorial integrity in the utilization and
protection of the water resources of the Mekong River Basin. " "'
The remaining thirty-five provisions of the Agreement concern

Id. at art. 3.
Id. at art. 5.
Id.
Id. at art. 8.
Article I of the Mekong Agreement provides:
The parties agree: To cooperate in all fields of sustainable development,
utilization, management and conservation of the water and related
resources of the Mekong River Basin including, but not limited to
irrigation, hydro-power, navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber floating,
recreation and tourism, in a manner to optimize the multiple-use and
mutual benefits of all riparians and to minimize the harmful effects that
might result from natural occurrences and man-made activities.
Mekong Agreement, supra note 107, at art. 1.
115. Id. at art. 4.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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Annexes, which form an integral part of the accord. 8'
Under Article 2, which contains the overall purpose of the treaty,
the Parties agree to
[Sitrive at achieving the goals of a sustainable and equitable
water management, including the conservation, improvement
and the rational use of surface waters and ground water in the
catchment area as far as possible;. ..make all efforts to control

the hazards originating from accidents involving substances
hazardous to water, floods and ice-hazards of the Danube; [and]
...endeavour to contribute to reducing the pollution loads of
the Black Sea from sources in the catchment area.M
To meet these goals, the Parties undertake to "cooperate on
fundamental water management issues and take all appropriate legal,
administrative and technical measures,..,. at least maintain and improve
the current environmental and water quality conditions of the Danube..
•[and] prevent and reduce as far as possible adverse impacts and changes
occurring or likely to be caused.""' The "polluter pays principle and the
precautionary principle" are the basis for the measures aimed at protecting
the Danube.'
The International Commission, established under Part III, is to
implement the "objectives and provisions" of the Convention,' including,
inter alia, the cooperation detailed in Article 4 and Part II of the agreement.9°
Despite this recent agreement, and a marked resistance by states to
resort to third-party adjudication of their watercourse disputes, Hungary
and Slovakia currently have a dispute concerning the Danube before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).9" It is the first case in this field since the
1929 River Oder92 and 1937 River Meuse disputes 3 and the Lake Lanoux
85. Danube Convention, supra note 84, at art. 20.
86. Id. at art. 2(0).

87. Id. at art. 2(2).
88. Id. at art. 2(4).
89. Id. at art. 18.
90. See, e.g., id. at art. 5-17.
91. Special Agreement for the Submission to the International Court of Justice of the
Difference Between Them Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, Apr. 7, 1993,
Hung.-Slov., 32 I.L.M. 1293 (1993) (entered into force June 28, 1993) [hereinafter Special
Agreement]; see also Erik Hoenderkamp, The Danube: Damned or Dammed? The Dispute
Between Hungary and Slovakia Concerning the Gavcfkovo-Nagynmaros Project, 8 LEIDEN J. INT'L
LAW 287 (1995); G.M. Berrisch, The Danube Dam Dispute underInternationalLaw, 46 AUSTRIAN
J.PuB. INT'L LAw 231 (1994); G. Englefield, The InternationalBoundary Between Hungary and
Slovakia: The Nagymnaros-Gabcikovo Dispute, BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN 15 (1993).
92. Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the
River Oder (U.K., Czech. Rep., Den., Fr., Ger., Swed., and Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23.
93. Diversion of Water from the River Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
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arbitration." Hungary and Slovakia are at odds over development of a
hydro-electric project agreed to in the Treaty of Budapest.9' Hungary
unilaterally stopped work on the dam in 1989 and terminated the treaty in
1992. Slovakia reacted by diverting the Danube for use at a power plant on
its territory, thereby implementing its "provisional solution. "" Each side
challenges the legality of the other's actions on various grounds.9 7 The ICJ
is expected to render a decision on the case within the next couple of years.
3. The HalahaRiver, Kerulen River, Bor Nor Lake and Bulgan River
(Chinaand Mongolia)
On April 29, 1994, the governments of the People's Republic of
China and Mongolia signed an agreement relating to the protection and
utilization of transboundary waters." The agreement covers the Halaha
River, Kerulen River, Bor Nor Lake, Bulgan River and those "lakes, rivers,
streams and other waters that straddle or rest on the boundary line between
the two countries."99
Under Article 2, cooperation is introduced "[flor the purpose of
protection and equitable and rational use of transboundary waters".100
Article 4 extends this notion, and contains the central substantive rule of the
convention. It provides:
The Two Contracting Parties should jointly protect the ecological system of transboundary waters and develop and utilize
transboundary waters in a way that should not be detrimental
to the other side. Any development and utilization of transboundary waters should follow the principle of fairness and equability without impeding any reasonable use of transboundary
waters. o
This is to be accomplished, inter alia, through the principles of
cooperation set forth in Articles 2 and 3, and specific provisions for
consultation and exchange of information contained elsewhere in the
No. 70, at 3.
94. 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957). See also decisions discussed in Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/5409, V61. 3, 472-88 (1963).
95. Convention Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Hydraulic Works
of Bos/Gabclkovo-Nagymaros, Sept. 16,1977, Hung.-Yugo, 1109 U.N.T.S. 236 (1978); see also
32 I.L.M. 1247 (1993).
96. See Special Agreement, supra note 91.
97. Id. at 2 (noting the specific issues to be decided by the ICJ).
98. Agreement on the Protection and Utilization of Transboundary Waters, Apr. 29,
1994, P.R.C.-Mong. (entered into force Jan. 16, 1995) (English translation of agreement on
file with author) [hereinafter Chinese-Mongolian Agreement).
99. Id. at art. 1.
100. Id. at art. 2.
101. Id. at art. 4(1).
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details relating to the Mekong River Commission and the coming into force
of the convention. Article 26 makes the Joint Committee, one of three
permanent bodies of the Commission, responsible for elaborating the rules
regarding water use and inter-basin diversions. 6
5. The Jordan River (Israeland Jordan)
The Treaty of Peace entered into between Israel and Jordan on
October 26, 1994"" contains two articles and two annexes relating
specifically to shared international waters." 8 Article 15"" and Annex IV
of the Treaty of Peace, which contain environmental measures, also apply
to water resources generally.20
Article 6 of the Treaty recognizes that the "water resources are not
sufficient to meet [the Parties'] needs" and commits them to deal with the
"water issues along their entire boundary.., in their totality." A recurrent
theme in the agreement is the Parties agreement "to search for ways to
alleviate water shortages and to cooperate."12' Article 6(2) provides:
The Parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just and

116. See the Mekong Agreement, articles 26 ("Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-Basin
Diversions") and 24 ("Functions of Joint Committee"). Mekong Agreement, supra note 107.

The Council, comprised of Ministerial representatives, approves the submissions of the Joint
Committee and is responsible for the overall policies and decisions relating to the
development of the Mekong basin. Id. at arts. 18, 24, 26.
117. A copy of the agreement on file with author [hereinafter Israeli-Jordani Agreement].
118. For a discussion of the Jordan River basin, see Miriam R. Lowi, Rivers of Conflict,
Rivers of Peace, 49 J. INr'L AFFAIRS 123 (1995).
119. The Israeli-Jordani Agreement states:
The Parties will co-operate in matters relating to the environment, a sphere
to which they attach great importance, including conservation of nature
and prevention of pollution, as set forth in Annex IV. They will negotiate
an agreement on the above, to be concluded not later than 6 months from
the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
lsraeli-Jordani Agreement, supra note 117, at art. 15.
120. For example, Part D of Annex IV provides that "Israel and Jordan agree to
cooperate along the common boundaries in the following aspects: ecological rehabilitation
of the Jordan River; environmental protection of water resources to ensure optimal water
quality, at reasonable useable standards." lsraeli-Jordani Agreement, supra note 117.
121. Id. at art. 6(4). The fields of cooperation include:
(a) development of existing and new water resources, increasing the water
availability, including cooperation on a regional basis as appropriate, and
minimizing wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses;
(b) prevention of contamination of water resources;
(c) mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages;
(d) transfer of information and joint research and development in
water-related subjects, and review of the potentials for enhancement of
water resources development and use.
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agreed solution to their water problems and with the view that
the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement of
co-operation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that the
management and development of their water resources do
12 not,
in any way, harm the water resources of the other Party.'
Annex 11 comprises seven Articles containing thirty-two
sub-paragraphs. Article 1 qtantifies the water allocated to each country
from the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers during the winter and summer
seasons. There is a proviso that Israel's existing uses of the Jordan between
its confluence with the Yarmouk and Tirat Zvi/Wadis Yabis be maintained.
The agreement states that "Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity
equivalent to that of Israel, provided, however, that Jordan's use will not
harm the quantity or quality of the above Israeli uses."" Further, Israel's
continued use of the groundwater located in Jordan is guaranteed. 24 Each
State is responsible for the management of the "shared waters" of the Jordan
and Yarmouk Rivers and the Arava/Araba groundwater located on its
territory."2 "Unauthorized withdrawals" of the other side's allocations are
to be protected against by each of the Parties. 26
There are repeated commitments on each side to cooperate in
finding sources to increase Jordan's water supplies, including the
construction of a diversion/storage dam on the Yarmouk, a system of water
storage on the Jordan.2 and various desalinization projects. 2 Planned
measures "which are likely to change the flow of either of the ... rivers

along their common boundary, or the quality of such flow" require six
month notice to the other side." The Joint Committee' 3 oversees such
the aim of preventing harm and mitigating adverse
matters "with
31
impacts."0

6. West Bank Water (Israeland the PalestinianAuthority)
In an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority,
signed September 24,1995, Israel pledged to increase the Palestinian's share

122. Id, at art. 6(2).
123. Id. at Annex 11,art. I(2)(c),.
124. Id. at art. IV.
125. Id. at art. IL.
126. Id. at art. 11(1), (6).
127. Id. at art. 1(1), (2).
128. Id. at art. 111(5).
129. Id. at art. V(2). Article V(1) holds that "artificial changes in or of the course of the
Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers can only be made by mutual agreement." Id. at art. V(1).
130. The Joint Water Committee is established under Article VII.
131. Id. at art. V(2).
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of West Bank water. 32 This is a difficult task as the resources are already
over-utilized and have a history of uneven distribution in favor of the

Israelis." The Parties signaled the importance of water by committing, in
their peace accord, to consider plans for the "equitable utilization of joint
water resources."'' It remains to be seen how this will be realized.135
D. An InternationalPerspective
Absent from the above survey of recent watercourse agreements
are examples from Africa, the Americas and India. This can be explained,
in part, by the fact that most watercourses in these regions are covered by
accords reached during the heyday of international 'river' contests some

three decades ago. Subsequent activity in these regions is characterized by
three general trends: (i) a general acceptance of the status quo of now
outdated agreements;"3 (ii) the conclusion of ad hoc agreements relating
to specific developments;137 (iii) the conclusion of environmental accords

132. INT'L HERALD TRIO., Sept. 25, 1995 at 1.
133. Sharif Elmusa, Dividing Common Water Resources According to International Water Law:
The Case of the Palestinian-IsraeliWaters, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 223, 226-232 (1995); see also
Lowi, supra note 118, at 133.
134. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,1993,
Israel-P.L.O., reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) and in 4 EUROPEAN J.INT'L L. 572 (1993).
135. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Designingthe Legal Structuresof Water Management Needed
to Fulfill the Israeli-PalestinianDeclarationof Principles,7 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 63 (1992/94)'
see also Elmusa, supra note 133, at 227-29; Lowi, supra note 118, at 133-134, where the author
reviews the vastly different levels of water consumption by the Arabs and Israelis in the
West Bank. Jewish settlers in the Jordan Valley consume approximately 368 liters of water
per capita per day, compared with 88 liters for West Bank Arabs (100 liters of water per day
is considered to be the minimum standard).
136. This has been the case in Africa and India. The Ganges River Agreement (17 I.L.M.
103 (1978)) was meant to be a temporary solution to an egregious battle between India and
Bangladesh. The Indus River Agreement between India and Pakistan effective since 1960
(419 UNTS 126 (1962)) has not prevented India from unilateral stoppages of water flow to
Pakistan's detriment. The regimes governing the Niger River basin (587 UNTS 9; 19 (1967))
and the Senegal basin (U.N. Treaties concerning the Utilization of International Watercourses for Other Purposes than Navigation: Africa, Natural Resources/Water Series No. 13, at
16) have become largely inoperative due to disagreements between certain riparians, a lack
of funding and mismanagement. Ministry of Water Resources, Nigeria, Interregional River
and Lake Commissions of Which Nigeria is a Member, in Proceedings of the U.N. Interregional
Meeting of International River Organizations 368-75, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/120, U.N. Sales No.
E.82.II.A.17 (1983).
137. Examples here abound in the Americas. The United States and Mexico have used
this approach to resolve a succession of problems over the Colorado River, which had been
covered by the 1944 agreement between the two countries (T.S. No. 994, United Nations,
Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12, at 236). Canada and
the United States have also concluded a number of agreements particular to certain
watercourses, such as the Columbia River (id. at 232), Lake of the Woods (44 Stat. 2108;
TIAS 6); tlie Great Lakes (TIAS 10798), etc., while all international watercourse issues had
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which affect watercourse use.'3
E. Summary ObservationsRegardingState Practice
The State practice surveyed above leads to the following
observations:
1. States appear reluctant to conclude agreements containing rules
covering water use generally. Particular problems are dealt with in the
context of specific agreements, relating either to certain watercourses or
precise issues.
2. The only agreements establishing rules for water use generally,
the Chinese-Mongolian Agreement and the Mekong Treaty are based upon
the principle of equitable utilization.'"
3. The only agreement applying no significant harm as a
substantive rule is the140lsraeli-Jordani Agreement, where the rule is used to
protect existing uses.

4. Each agreement provides for the equitable and reasonable use of
the international waters covered by the accord.1'"
efforts" standard to limit
5. Each agreement incorporates a "best
142
adverse transboundary impact of water use.

been addressed by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. In South America, the Rio de laPlata
basin has a series of ad hoc and mostly bilateral agreements which deal with the
development of the major rivers of the system despite the multilateral Treaty on the River
Plate Basin of 1969 (8 LL.M. 905 (1969).
138. See, e.g., the Agreement on the Action Plan for the Environmentally Sound
Management of the Common Zambezi River System, 27 I.L.M. 1112 (1988) ("ZACPLAN");
Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (17 I.L.M. 1045 (1978). For a discussion of African
practice, see also Mutoy Mubiala, L'tVOLUTION DU DROIT DES COURS D'EAU INTERNAT1ONAUX
,kLA LUMItRE DE L'EXPKRIENCE AFRICAINE, NOTAMMENT DANS LE BASSIN DU CONGO/ZAIRE

(1995). Canada, Mexico and the United States have recently established the North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation as part of implementation of the North America
Free Trade Agreement. For more details, see Stephen Mumme, The North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperationand the United States-Mexico Border Region: The Case
of Air and Water, 9 TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES REP. 1 (1995).

139. Chinese-Mongolian Agreement, supra note 98, at art. 2; see also Chinese-Mongolian
Agreement, id. at art. 4(1), which appears to balance the principles of equitable utilization
and no significant harm but ends favoring the former rule. The -last part of the provision
reads: "without impeding any reasonable use of transboundary waters." Mekong
Agreement, supra note 107, at art. 5.
140. lsraeli-Jordani Agreement, supra note 117, at art. 1(2)(C), 3(1)(6), 4, 5(2), 6(2), Annex
II.
141. Helsinki Convention, supra note 47, at art. 2(2)(c); Meuse and Scheldt Agreements,
supra notes 69 and 70, at art. 2; Danube Convention supra note 84, at art. 2; ChineseMongolian Agreement, supra note 98, at arts. 2,4(1); Mekong Agreement, supra note 107 at
art. 5; Israeli-Jordani Agreement, supra note 117, at art. 6.
142. Helsinki Convention, supra note 47, at art. 2, 3; Meuse and Scheldt Agreements,
supra notes 141, at art. 3; Danube Convention, supra note 84, at art. 2; Chinese-Mongolian
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6. The 'European' agreements, which each address the issue of
transboundary impact, describe conduct required to meet this goal, but do
not define substantive rules governing water use.1

7. Each agreement provides for cooperation between the Parties'"
and the creation of an institutional framework to assist in this exercise.145
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE RULES GOVERNING
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES

The importance of the task ahead of the UN's Working Committee
is highlighted by the number of yet unsettled watercourse regimes. 1" The
obligations that states have agreed to in the watercourse agreements
surveyed above are indicative of what may be acceptable in the field. It is
unlikely that states will embrace a no significant harm approach to
except in special cases where existing uses are
watercourse development,
47
to be protected.1
The ILC's Draft proposes that the due-diligence-notto-cause-significant-harm rule govern watercourse use. This is problematic
for three reasons: (i) it is inconsistent with state practice; 4 ' (ii) in the final

analysis, it amounts to a no significant harm rule and as such suffers
shortcomings similar to its predecessor;4 9 (iii) it distorts the function of
the due diligence rule by using it to define the legitimacy of a use, instead
of having it perform its traditional role. Due diligence is a standard,not a
definition, of lawful state activity.1 s

Agreement, supra note 98, at art. 6; Mekong Agreement, supra note 107, at art. 5;
lsraeli-Jordani Agreement, supra note 117, art. 6(2), Annex II art. Ill, IV, V(2).
143. Helsinki Convention, supra note 47, at art. 2; Meuse and Scheldt Agreements, supra
note 69 & 70, at art. 3; Danube Convention, supra note 84, at art. 5.
144. Helsinki Convention, supra note 47, at art. 2(6), 9(1); Meuse and Scheldt Agreements,
supra notes 69 and 70, at art. 3; Danube Convention, supra note 84, at art. 4, Part 11;
Chinese-Mongolian Agreement, supra note 98, at art. 2, 3, 5(1) (providing that the parties
"may conduct cooperation"); Mekong Agreement, supra note 107, at art. 1; lsraeli-Jordani
Agreement, supra note 117, at art. 6(4), Annex II art. 1(3), II and VI.
145. Helsinki Convention, supra note 47, at art. 9(2); Meuse and Scheldt Agreements,
supranotes 69 and 70, at art. 2(2); Danube Convention, supra note 84, at art. 18; Chinese-Mongolian Agreement, supra note 98, at art. 10; Mekong Agreement, supra note 107, at Chapter
IV; Israeli-Jordani Agreement, supra note 117, art. VII, Annex II.
146. These include watercourses in most regions of the world, such as, e.g., the
Brahmaputra, the Ganges, the Jordan, the Nile, and the Tigris-Euphrates.
147. This has been, and likely will be, the case of the Nile. Egypt uses the lion's share
of the Nile's waters and claims a vested right to such appropriations. Vidal, supra note 1.
148. See "observations," supra at 24.
149. See the Swiss Government's Response to the ILC's 1991 Draft Articles, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/447, at 49-54 (1993); see also Wouters, supra note 48, at 83-86.
150. The origins of the notion of due diligence are found in the Alabama Claims Case,
in 1 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 485 (1872); Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871,
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States recognize that most uses of international watercourses will
result in some harm, perhaps even significant harm being caused to other

watercourse states. This is permitted by states where: (i) the use is an
equitable and reasonable one (a definitional question) and (ii) the harming
State(s) undertakes its "best efforts" to limit the transboundary harm (a
standard of behavior contingent upon the first condition). The ILC's Article
7 not only fails to implement this practice, but subverts it. The ILC's Special

Rapporteurs

15
Rosenstock,

McCaffrey"5 2 and Schwebel'5 3 each

recommended that the principle of equitable utilization govern the
substantive rules of the Draft Articles on watercourse law. Recent state
practice supports this view.

As governments prepare their submissions for the UN, and the
Committee of the Whole anticipates- its work, they are encouraged to
reconsider carefully the substantive rules contained in Part II of the ILC's

Draft Articles. The successful elaboration of a framework convention
relating to watercourse law will depend ultimately upon its acceptance by
states. Rules for watercourse use based upon equity and reason promote a

with Protocols of the Tribunal and Arbitral Award, 20 Martens Nouveau Receui 698 (1875);
see also Blomeyer-Bartenstein, Due Diligence, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INTL L. 1110 (R.
Bernhardt ed., 1992).
151. The last Rapporteur to deal with watercourses, Robert Rosenstock, proposed that
Article 7 be redrafted to read:
Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international
watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant harm to other
watercourse States absent their agreement, except as may be allowable under
an equitable and reasonable use of the watercourse. A use which causes
significant harm in the form of pollution shall be presumed to be an
inequitable and unreasonable use unless there is: (a) a clear showing of
special circumstances indicating a compelling need for ad hoc adjustment;
and (b) the absence of any imminent threat to human health and safety.
Robert Rosenstock, First Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/451 (emphasis added); see also Second Report on the Law of
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/462
152. Rapporteur McCaffrey recommended that
the "no appreciable harm" article be redrafted in such a way as to bring it
into conformity with . . . the principle of equitable utilization . . [Tihe
focus should be on the duty not to cause legal injury (by making a
non-equitable use) rather than on the duty not to cause factual harm...
Imn the context of watercourses, suffering even significant harm may not
infringe the rights of the harmed State if the harm is within the limits
allowed by an equitable utilization.
Stephen McCaffrey, Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, [19861 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 133, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/399, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/399/Add. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/399/2.
153. Stephen M. Schwebel, Third Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, [19821 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 103, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348.
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balanced approach to watercourse development which has been endorsed
by state practice.

